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Based on the work of HeIIwig [12J, this paper compares the implementation of the second best 
allocation (non traded solution) by a fmancial intermediary to the one achieved in a walrasian market in 
which individuals hold the assets directly (traded solution). In this framework, in which individuals 
have smooth preferences, the traded and non traded solutions are no longer welfare equivalent; in fact, 
the non traded solution allows for greater risk sharing than the traded one. This result, and contrary to 
HeIIwig's work, shows that fmancial intermediaries do provide for a positive role in the economy. 
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The role of demand deposits in risk sharing 
1.- Introduction 
Modem financial intermediation literature has been concerned with explaining the nature of optimal bank 
liability contracts (deposits) intended to ensure preference shocks and coordination problems derived from the 
above contracts leading to phenomena such as bank runs and measures to cope with them. Examples of such 
work are Diamond and Dybvig [9], Bryant [7] and Chari and Jagannathan [81 among others. However, these 
papers are primarily concerned with modeling bank runs and therefore the role of demand deposits is not fully 
explored. 
Another branch of literature has analyzed the different degrees of risk sharing provided by demand deposits 
and traded equity contracts 1• The purpose of these papers is to show whether financial intermediaries have a 
positive role in the economy, by ensuring liquidity needs or on the contrary, these same services can be 
provided by other nOf.-financial intermediaries without the risk of bank runs. The papers of Jacklin [13], Jacklin 
[14], Hellwig [12] and Jacklin and Bhattacharya [4] are examples of such work2• As Jacklin [13] has noted, 
and is confirmed also in the work of Hellwig, the Diamond Dybvig specification with no aggregate uncertainty 
about preferences, has the feature that the ex-ante optimal allocation is also implementable through trading, 
where shares of the investment portfolio (of short and long term assets) could be traded at date 1 as with a 
mutual fund. This rules out any specialness on the side of a financial intermediary. In a later paper, Jacklin [14J 
shows that unless there is both aggregate uncertainty about preferences and banks assets are risky, with 
depositors asymmetrically informed about asset quality, then traded equity contracts can provide the same 
services as demand deposit contracts, without the possibility of panics. The message of his paper is that liquidity 
transformation can and should be provided using equity contracts where the underlying assets mayor not be 
risky, but where there is little or no potential for asymmetries of information about asset quality. The above 
papers considered models in which individuals have corner preferences, that are not considered a realistic 
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characterisation of individuals' preferences. With smooth preferences and no aggregate uncertainty about 
preferences, Jacklin [13] has shown that non traded demand deposit contracts and traded equity are not welfare 
equivalent. In fact, demand deposits are shown to provide greater risk sharing than equity shares. Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya [4] also considered the relative degree of risk sharing provided by traded and non traded contracts, 
in a framework in which bank assets are risky and individuals (with smooth !Jreferences) are informed 
concerning bank asset quality. The basic result is that deposit contracts tend to be better for financing low risk 
assets. 
The motivation of this paper is to compare the traded and non traded solutions in this economy, with 
smooth preferences and in which there exists a reinvestment opportunity from date 1 to date 2. It will be shown, 
that in this framework, demand deposits and traded equity are no longer welfare equivalent. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The basic framework of the model is presented in section 2. The 
first-best and second-best allocations under con:plete and incomplete information, respectively, are derived in 
subsections 2.1 and 2.2. Section 3 compares the second-best allocation (non-traded solution) with the allocations 
that are achieved in a walrasian market in which individuals hold the assets directly. Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
2.- Description of the model 
The hypothesis of the model are summarized as follows: 
a.- Three period economy: T == 0, 1, 2 
b.- One good per period 
c.- There are three investment opportunities: 
L- A short-term asset at T=O that yields a sure return bO ] at T= 1 
ii.- A long-term asset at T==O that yields a sure return b
o2 at T==2, premature liquidation of the asset is 
feasible but the rate of return is only b1<bo] 
iii.- A short-term asset at T== 1 that yields a random return 612 ~ 1 at T==2. The random variable is known 
at T== 1 but not at T==O, at date 0, only the distribution function is known3• 
d.- On the household side of the economy, there is a continuum of unit mass of ex ante identical consumers 
that are uncertain at T==O about their consumption needs. They are subject at T= 1 to a privately observed 
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uninsurable risk of being of type-l with probability t or of type-2 with probability 1 -t. 
Preferences will be represented by an additive utility function which is of the form: 
I-y I-y 
. CH C2i U'(CpCpp.)=-- + p.--
, , , l-y 'l-y 
where: 0 ~ Pi d, i = 1, 2 (type), PI<P2 and y is the CRRA coefficient. 
[1] 
As commented in the introduction, it is assumed a more general preference structure with respect to 
Hellwig as individuals derive utility from consumption in both periods, with type-l agents deriving 
relatively more utility from consumption in the first period with respect to type-2 agents. 
e.- Consumers are endowed with ko units of the good at T==O to be divided between short-term and long-term 
investments. 
f.- It is assumed no aggregate uncertainty, so that with probability one a fraction t of consumers are of type-l 
and a fraction 1 -I of type-2. 
The economy must deal with the following allocation problem: 
a.- At T ==0 the initial endowment must be divided between short and long term investments (ko =kol +ko2) 
b.- At T==l the fraction (O~f.L~I) of the long-term investment that is liquidated must be determined, this may 
depend on the observed value of b12 • 
C.- At T== 1 the returns from short-term assets and possibly liquidated long-term investments must be divided 
between consumption and new short-term inver,tments, this may also depend on the observed realization 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the main objective of this work is to compare the second best 
allocation or non-traded solution (social optimum constrained by incentive compatibility4) with the allocations 
achieved in a walrasian market or traded solution. 
As a benchmark case, the complete information situation is studied first. 
2.1 .- First best allocations under complete information 
In the complete information case, it is assumed the type of the consumer is publicly observable and in this 
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situation, the efficient allocation will be the solution to the foilowing problem: 
max E[tU(Cll ,c21' Pl)+(1-t)U(c12,C22' P2)] 
c(j.kol ):02,il 
s.t kol +ko2=ko 
tcu +(1-t)c12 ~bolkol+bliiko2 
tC2l + (l-t)c22 = b o2(l-ii)ko2 + b 12[b olkol + bl ii k02 -tcll - (l-t)C12] 
blb12<bo2 
ii~l 
cij~O 
ii~O 
[2] 
The utility function is the one described above in Point d of Page 3. cll ' C2l represents the prior plan 
indicating the consumption bundle allocated to type-l consumers and C12' C22 the plan allocated to type-2 
consumers. The feasibility constraints are the second and third constraints respectively. The second one requires 
that aggregate consumption at T = 1 should be less or equal to aggregate resources per capita available from 
short-term investments and possibly liquidated long-term ones. Similarly, the third constraint requires that 
aggregate consumption at T=2 should be covered by non liquidated long-term investments plus short-term 
reinvestments of unused resources at T = 15• The fourth constraint states that at date 1, it is never desirable to 
liquidate long-term investments in order to make room for new short-term ones. 
This maximization problem is solved as a three-step problem: 
a.- In a first step, the initial investment choices, (kol ' ko2) are considered as exogenous parameters and the 
optimal consumption levels and liquidation policy are determined. 
h.- In a second step the indirect utility function derived in the first step is maximized on kol arid k02' and so 
the optimal levels of the initial investments are obtained. 
C.- Finally, the optimal levels of kol and k02 are substituted back into the first step problem, and the final 
solution is reached. Although this last step is obvious, it has just been added to clarify how the numerical 
solutions presented in the figures have been derived. 
The solution to the first best problem gives the main result of the section, expressed by the following 
proposition: 
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Proposition 1. Let (kol' ko2' C;I' C;2' C;I' C;2' j..L *) be a solution to the first best problem and define: 
[3] 
Then: 
. C21 
[ j-I/Y t+(l-t) :~ [4] 
• PI • [ j
-I/Y 
C22= ~ C21 
fL*=O 
[5] 
Where A I is the Lagrange multipli~r associated with the second resource constraint. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Lemma 1. The optimal k;l satisfies: kolcrit."k;l d 
where: 
.r.:! 
b Y -I/Y 
02 PI 
[6] 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Given that kol is an endogenous variable, this characterization may seem awkward, but it is understood 
in terms of dynamic programming considerations. As mentioned before, the maximization problem [2] has been 
solved as a three step problem: In the first step, kol and k02 were considered as exogenous parameters and the 
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optimal consumption levels were obtained, in the second step, the optimal levels of the initial investments were 
derived, maximizing on kol and ko2 the indirect utility function of the first step problem: 
- Given that this k:l is always above the critical value, kolcrit, the optimal solution involves no liquidation 
of the long-term asset. The consumption levels are the ones specified in Proposition 1. It is observed that 
for low values of the random return, and up to a limit value, consumption is independent of h12' but once 
this limit value is achieved, first period consumption decreases, second period consumption increases with 
the random return. The explanation is that given the high value of the random return, it becomes 
advantageous to reinvest some of the return from the short-term asset available at T=l, in the new short-
term technology. As mentioned in Hellwig, from an ex-ante point of view, the uncertainty about the 
random return is seen as a source of opportunities rather than a threat. While long-term investments are 
earmarked for consumption at date 2, short-term investments are not necessarily earmarked for 
consumption at date 1. The choice between consumption and investment depends on the rate of returnh12 
on the new short-term investments. 
2.1.1.- Numerical simulations 
In order to provide a graphical plot of the optimal solution, some numerical simulations have been developed 
for the input data given in Table I. The optimal consumption levels corresponding to the first best allocation 
are shown in Figure 1. 
2.2.- Second best allocations under incomplete information 
In this case it is assumed that the realization of the timing of the consumption needs is private information of 
the consumer. Given this Information asymmetry, an allocation can only be implemented if it is incentive 
compatible, that is, if it gives no consumer an incentive to lie or deviate about what he actually wants to 
consume. 
In the case of a type-l agent, incentive compatibility requires that the consumption bundle he receives if 
he is honest (c 12, C22 ), should be at least as large as what he gets by lying and behaving like a type-l agent 
(c 11' c21 ) and then reinvesting in the backyard technology in the optimal way for him. If he reinvested part of 
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his first period allocation (C u) in the new short term asset, his optimal consumption levels in both periods 
C;, c; are the solution to the following problem: 1 ) 
I-y I-y 
Cl C2 
max --+P2--
C.'C2 1 -y l-y 
s.t Cl :s;cu 
c2 =(cu -c1)b12 +C21 
which yields: 
The incentive compatibility constraint for a type-2 agent is then: 
The incentive constraints for a type-l agent would be obtained in a similar way. 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
In the absence of any other backyard technology (for converting date 2 consumption into date 1) there is 
no other incentive constraint to be considered. 
Taking the incentive constraints into account, the second-best problem is a solution to the following one: 
s.t kOI +ko2 =ko 
tcu +(I-t)cI2 :s;boiol+bliiko2 
tC21 + (I-t) e22 =b 02(1- ii) k02 + bl2[b olkol + bl ii k02 -tcll (I-t) c12] 
blbl2<b02 
ii:s;l 
cij~O 
ii~O 
le constraints 
[10] 
[11] 
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2.2.1.- Numerical simulations 
The analytical treatment of the second-best solution is quite a tedious one, therefore numerical solutions have 
been computed6• The working procedure is the same as for the first-best case, i.e., the problem is solved in 
three steps. 
There are some remarks to be pointed out: 
a.- In the second-best allocation the incentive constraint for type-l agents is binding, whereas that of type-2 
agents is never binding. 
h.- The second-best allocation does not involve liquidation of the long-term asset. This result differs from 
Hellwig as in his case the second best allocation may involve liquidation of the long-term technology. 
Although this result is based on numerical analysis, it seems that similarly to the first best allocation, the 
utility function is always a continuous and increasing function in koI in Case C7 , and therefore, the optimal 
level of the initial investment will be at least koIcrit. On the contrary, in Hellwig's case, the utility function 
(in the liquidation solution) is increasing in koI but it is not continuous in the limit case koIcrit, that 
distinguishes the liquidation and non-liquidation solutions, and therefore, the optimal k;I may occur in the 
liquidation case, for values of kOI sufficiently close but below koIcrit. 
C.- The optimal solution has been derived for the input data of Table I. A graphical plot of the optimal solution 
is given by Figure 2. 
3.- Comparison with a walrasian market. 
This section will compare the second best allocation (non-traded solution) to the competitive equilibrium in an 
equity economy (traded solution). Suppose that at T=l, there was a walrasian market for date 1 and date 2 
consumption goods, in which consumers participate with endowments consisting of boIkoI units of the date 1 
good and b o.Jco2 units of the date 2 good. Let ~ = 1 + r be some equilibrium interest rate at which individuals 
are willing to trade good 1 in exchange for good 2, and so that for any agent j: 
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[12] 
j=1,2 
where Bj is the quantity demanded (or s'Jpplied) of good I in exchange for good 2 and with L Bj =0 across 
j 
agents determining ~, subject to the caveat ~ ~ b12 , the short term realized (storage) rate from T= 1 to T=2. 
If storage (with ~ =b12 ) is done then 0 ~ L Bj ~ -bolkol is the constraint overall. 
j 
The individuals' maximization problems are shown below: 
Type-l problem at T=l 
with solution: 
Type-2 problem at T=l 
with solution: 
Cll C21 1
1-Y I-Y) 
max --+p--
B, l-y 1 1_y 
S.t cll =bo1kol +BI 
c21 =bo2 ko2 -~BI 
B = (pI~rI/Ybo2ko2-bolkol 
I I +(pI~rI/Y~ 
s.t CI2 =bo]ko]+B2 
C22 =bo2ko2 -~B2 
B = (p2~rI/Y bo2 ko2 -bO]ko] 
2 1 +(p2~rI/Y ~ 
[13] 
[14] 
[IS] 
[16] 
From the equilibrium condition L Bj =0 , the following non-linear equation in ~ is obtained, that is: 
j 
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t (PIR,.rl/Vbo2k02-bOlkOI + (1-t) (P2R,.)-I/Vb02k02-bOlkOI =0 
1 +(PIR,.r lfV R,. 1 +(P2R,.)-I/y R,. 
[17] 
The value of R; is obtained as a solution to the above equation, and from it the values of B; and B; are 
derived. These values are substituted in the expressions for ell' e 21 and e 12, e22 , to calculate ex-
ante expected 
utility in this economy. 
In this case the equilibrium interest rate is R; = b12 , the realized short term return. 
The optimal levels of B; and B; are: 
B* = (P2bI2rl/Y bo2 ko2 -bo1kol 
2 1 +(P2 bl2rl/Y bl2 
[18] 
and from them, the optimal consumption levels and the value of the expected utility are obtaine
d. 
Table II shows the numerical computations of the traded solution for the input data of Table I. 
In order to compare the expected utility obtained in the non traded solution with respect to the tra
ded one, 
some numerical examples have been computed. The input data are those corresponding to Table
 I, where the 
variations in the exogenous parameters and the results of these comparisons are shown in Figure 3
 to Figure 5. 
It is observed that in all the examples the non-traded solution is always welfare superior, also, as 
the value 
of the random return increases, the difference in utility diminishes. This result differs from Hell
wig, as in his 
case, the traded and non-traded solutions coincide. 
It may be concluded that, if preferences are represented by an additive utility function, the allocations 
obtained in the non-traded solution are welfare superior with respect to the ones achieved in the traded one. 
The intuition for this result can be viewed in terms of individual versus coalition incentive comp
atibility. (See 
Jacklin [13]). Since demand deposits cannot be traded, they can be used to achieve any allocation that is 
individually incentive compatible. On the other hand, the allocation achieved in the traded 
solution is a 
competitive equilibrium and thus represents an element in the core of the economy in which ind
ividuals start 
trading with identical initial endowments. By definition all elements in the core are not only
 individually 
incentive compatible but also ccalitionally incentive compatible (that is, there does not exist a coalition of 
individuals each of whom can be made better off by following a strategy specified by the coali
tion and then 
redistributing the coalition's total allocation). 
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In both the demand deposit and equity economies, the same objective function (i.e. ex ante expected utility) 
is being maximized, but in the non traded solution it is maximized over a less constrained set and therefore 
demand deposits can generally achieve greater risk sharing than equity contracts. 
4.- Concluding remarks 
The main purpose of the paper has been to analyze the role of financial intermediaries versus walrasian markets, 
in ensuring preference shocks, in a framework in which there is no aggregate uncertainty, individuals have 
smooth preferences and there exists a short term investment opportunity between dates 1 and 2. 
It has been shown that demand deposit contracts provide greater risk sharing than equity contracts. This 
result (and contrary to HeUwig's model) shows that financial intermediaries do provide a positive role in the 
economy. 
The analysis of this paper may be of interest in the design of financial systems in emerging markets. An 
example is Eastern Europe, in which a new financial system is being established almost from scratch, and poses 
the question, whether it should be a stock-market based, American type system or a bank-based German type 
system. 
Appendix A: Additive Utility Function 
A.- First Best allocation 
The first best allocation is obtained as a solution to the following problem: 
s.t. 
Cn C21 CI2 C22 1 [ I-y I-y 1 [ I-y I-y 11 max t --+Pl-- +(1-t) --+P2--~~ l-y l-y l-y l-y 
tCn +(1-t)CI2 ~bolkol +l1 ko2b l 
tC21 + (1 - t) C22 = (1 -l1)bo2 ko2 +[ 11 k02b l + bo1kOl - tCn - (1 - t) CI2 )b12 
Cij~O 
l1~O 
[1] 
[2] 
The Lagragian is formed by using the !agrangian multipliers AI and A2 of the two first resource constraints. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditicns are: 
tc;: -A l t+tbI2 A2=0 
t P I C;IY + t A2 = 0 
(1 - t) c;; -A 1(1 - t) + (1 - t) b 12 A2 = 0 
(1- t) P2 c;Y + (1- t) A2 = 0 
ko2bl AI -ko2 (b l bl2 -bo2) A2 =0 
tCII +(1-t)C I2 -bolkoI-j.1ko2bl ,,0 
tC21 + (1 - t)C22 - (1 -j.1)bo2 k o2 -[ IJ. ko2bl + bo1koI - tCII - (1- t)CI2 ]bI2 =0 
A.1 .- First-step solution: 
The following cases may be considered: 
A.1.1.- CASE A: (AI>O) 
The equations to be solved are: 
[4] 
[6] 
[8] 
12 
if CII >0 [a] 
if C21 >0 [b] 
if c12 >O [cl 
if C22 >0 [d] 
[3] 
if j.1>0 re] 
if AI>O [f) 
'<IA2 [g] 
[5] 
[7] 
[9] 
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The optimal solution to this problem yields: 
In Case A it is assumed Al >0, from [4] and [5]: 
[11] 
Substituting C;I and C;I in the expression for 1..1' the foIlowing condition on bl2 for this case to hold is 
obtained: 
b
I2
<2.!bO,kO, 1+(1-1)( ~ r 11-' =b
lim 
PI bo2 ko2 
[12] 
Similarly it is assumed I-L' =0, that means aL ~O 
al-L 
[13] 
Substituting AI =c;i -b12 PI c;i and 1..2 = - PI c;i in the above expression, the condition on kOI' for this case to 
hold is obtained: 
[14] 
If the optimal level of the initial investment is above this limit value (ko1crit) there is no liquidation in the 
optimal solution. 
A .. 1.2.- CASE B: (AI =0) 
The F.O.C. in this case are: 
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[15] [17] 
[18] [16] 
[19] 
and the optimal solution is: 
In Case B it is assumed 1..1 =0, or equivalently: 
[21] 
Substituting the optimal consumption levels, the following expression for the random return is obtained: 
[22] 
A.1.3.- CASE C: (1.. 1>0, ~'>O) 
The equations to be solved are the [3] and the optimal solution is: 
In this case, it is assumed a valuo for ~. >0, that is, sUbstituting C;I and, C;2 in the expression for ~', the 
condition on kol for this case to be satisfied is obtained: 
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1.:!. 
b Y -I/y 
02 PI 
k01 < -b-
01
-b-;-I/Y-[-t-+-(1--'--t)-r-:-: ]---1/-Y -+-b-o-:;-I-p-~-I/Y = k 01crit [24] 
A.2.- Second-step solution: 
The second step is the solution to the expression: 
[25] 
rnax f:m" U·(C)./tb12)dbI2 
kol DlUl 
au ·(C) rb ... '_./tb )db =0 J b. ak 12 12 
DUll 01 
[26] 
That is, if au·(c) >0 in the interval [b .,b ], the maximum is reached in k01crit. The proof is given by: ak rwn max 
01 
[27] 
where: 
-I 
bl Y b02 (b01 -bl) 
[28] 
By assumption bl <b01 and therefore, a~·(C) >0 which implies k;1 ?k01crit, this mans that, the optimal solution 
01 
falls always in Cases A and B, with no liquidation of the long-term asset. 
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Figure 2.- Optimal consumption levels in the second-best allocation 
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Figure 3 to Figure 5.- Expected utility of non-traded minus traded solution 
1. Traded equity contracts refer to the allocations achieved in a walrasian market in which individuals hold the assets directly. 
2.These models ofintertemporal liquidity risk have been recently extended to compare banks versus markets. in a dynamic framework (see 
Fulghieri and Rovelli [11). Dutta and Kapur [10}. Bhattacharya and Padilla [2} and Bhattacharya. Fulghieri and Rovelli [3} as examples 
of such work). 
3. For simplicity. a triangular distribution for the random return is assumed. The use of this distribution. defined by its mean and standard 
deviation. does not affect the qualitative nature of the results with respect to Hellwig. 
4. As shown in Jacklin [13} and is commented also in the work of Hellwig. the demand deposit contract can be used to achieve the 
constrained social optimum. 
5. Given the observed realization of the short term return. b12 • the decision between consumption and reinvestment in this new short term 
asset takes place. If there is no reinvestment. the second resource constraint would be satisfied as an equality. 
6. The system of non-linear equations was solved by the Newton Raphson technique. with the use of a computer program. that was written 
in MSDos Qbasic. 
7.See explanation of Case C in Appendix A 
